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the lawyer can and should do about them. In all, there is much
helpful material here for the student who envisions himself behind
the desk as a practicing lawyer, and for the member of the Bar
who takes time to consider his professional approach.
LSTER E. DENONN *

By Anthony Lewis.
Pp. 262. $4.95.

GIDEON'S TRUMPET.

House, 1964.

New York: Random

I trust this is an unorthodox review. The book is unorthodox;
unorthodox, that is, for lawyers, especially the average lawyer, for
Gideon's Trumpet involves the average case but a non-average client
and a non-average lawyer-with a non-average layman-writer.
This brings up two preliminary points of view. First, the
average student or lawyer reads a case as if it consisted merely of
words. He fails to understand the human element in the law.'
Although realizing that times change the law, 2 he fails to comprehend that personalities and persons may likewise do so. 3 The
total background of a case may be all-important, and this is why
the political scientist does a better job in this respect than
does the law professor. Witness, for example, the excellent background analysis of the lawyer's role in influencing the Sup'reme
Court to so interpret the fourteenth amendment as to create not
only the favorable conditions for American entrepreneurs in the
nineteenth century, but also a logical and legalistic strait-jacket
for the twentieth-century Court; 4 witness further the unfolding
factual background of the Steel Seizure Case of 1952, as viewed
by a non-lawyer. 5 And witness, at the other end, the praise of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter by a former student: "A case was explored as a process, through the record, the briefs, the counsel, the
• Member of the New York Bar.
'See

pages 54 and 55 of the volume, especially the latter, where Fortas

bad to face what he called a "moral problem."
2 Gideon's letter to Fortas closes: "I believe that each era finds a improvement in law each year brings something new for the benefit of mankind." LEwIs, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 78 (1964).
3 See, e.g., Lewis' discussion of such background matter. Id. at 49.
1Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942).
5
An
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
analysis of this case appears in WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW CASE (1958).
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judges, the statute, its legislative background, indeed the geography
of the area involved, preferably to be reported on by a student
who came from that locality." 6
Second, the average lawyer handles a case-as if it were merely
a conglomeration of facts to be educed from witnesses. He rarely
finds the facts already woven into-a connected whole, and even
his efforts to do so on trial, in summation, are seldom successful.
Generally, an appellate brief digests the facts as the witnesses
appeared and testified. Consequently, the judge must thereupon
become a hunter, literally as well as figuratively. It is the
exceptional brief that disregards this orthodox pattern and develops
the facts and counter-facts in a logical and chronological fashion.
And it is the very exceptional lawyer who puts touches of human
interest, albeit not overdone, into the story.
The reader of this review may scoff at these views. But has
he ever read them before? Moreover has he read the recent Recluse
of Herald Square by Surrogate Cox of New York County or the
Wellman books? 7 The Surrogate has made a probate case into a
human drama and almost a mystery "whodunit" story, while
Wellman has made a text become a warm and personal account
which teaches almost by osmosis. Are these exceptional writers?
The answer is written largely upon the shelves of any library,
for such authors are in abundance. I am not referring to the
"popular" versions of cases which omit, supply, and distort the
facts, or to those which emphasize the details of prurient interest.
The simple, straight story, if I may alliterate, is made a compelling,
warm, and human document which can stand as a true digest and
analysis of a case.
This is a roundabout way to introduce Gideon's Trumpet.
It is written by a non-lawyer, Anthony Lewis, who is a New York
Times' Washington reporter assigned primarily to the Supreme
Court. Lewis has given us not only a warm, human, connected
story of a Supreme Court reversal which still reverberates in state
corridors, but he has also given us legal sidelights and factual tidbits
which teach and endear. The case involved the unlettered, unknown,
but not now unsung, Clarence Earl Gideon, who phrased the issue
in his own reply when he requested certiorari: "It makes no
difference how old I am or what color I am or what church I
belong too [sic] if any. The question is I did not get a fair
trial. The question is very simple. I requested the court to
appoint me an attorney and the court refused."
How and why did this question arise? Lewis does an excellent
job in analyzing the holding of Bets v. Brady8 and its later develope Freund, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in FEI.ix FRANKFURTER--A TRIBUTE
148 (1964).
7The Wellman volumes all illustrate what is suggested. See, e.g.,
WELLMAN, Tm ART oF CROSS-EXAMINAION (4th ed. 1946).
8316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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ment. Briefly, the Supreme Court there held that a state, under
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, was not obligated
to furnish counsel in a criminal matter to an indigent defendant
who requested one, unless "an appraisal of the totality of facts in a
given case . . [disclosesi a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice. . . ." ' In applying this
rule each case had to be examined within its own context, and the
author discloses a list of circumstances which have developed over
the years in which a state denial of counsel constituted grounds
for a reversal. To illustrate, the Supreme Court's requirement
of special circumstances "might be his [the defendant's] own
illiteracy, ignorance, youth, or mental illness, the complexity of
the charge against him or the conduct of the prosecutor or judge
at the trial." However, Gideon claimed none of these, but merely
that "I requested the court to appoint me an attorney and the court
Upon these pathetic words an appeal was built, a
refused."
doctrine was reversed, a new uniform requirement was imposed
upon the states, 10 a new system of criminal justice was required
to be fashioned, and this volume was born.
Gideon's Trumpet sounds loud a story which is sufficiently
technical to delight a lawyer,11 and yet so down-to-earth in the
telling that a non-lawyer can comprehend every legalistic rule and
rationale. For example, can a procedural discussion of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction and discretionary .power under Article III of
the Constitution be of interest to the layman? In discussing cases
'such as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,'12 NAACP v. Alabama, 3 Dred
Scott v. Sandford,14 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 5 and Thompson v.
City of Louisville,'" Lewis makes this esoteric body of constitutional
Old. at 462.
part of his analysis Lewis presents the Frankfurter-Black issues,
one of which is their attitude toward federalism. In addition, he refers to
the committee report of the 1958 Conference of (State) Chief Justices, which
decried the "overall tendency" of the Supreme Court to press for extensions
of federal power. Lawis, op. cit. supra note 2, at 86-87. He then concludes
that the Gideo# case was, in effect, a request by the defendant to nationalize
still further by imposing "the universal requirement that counsel be supplied
to poor criminal defendants." Id. at 88.
"Although he has taken law courses, Mr. Lewis is not a lawyer and he
consequently slips, inadvertently, in his legal particulars. E.g., Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), did not find Chief Justice Marshall
writing "a specific decision that the Bill of Rights did not cover the states."
The holding of the case was limited to the fifth amendment's eminent domain
clause and its inapplicability to the states. The reasoning of the opinion
supports the broader statement by Lewis, and it has been so used. Of course,
by later particular judicial selection and inclusion, the holding has been
narrowed to almost a present-day vanishing point.
1OAs

1214

U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

13357 U.S. 449 (1958).

U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
1304 U:S. 64 (1938).
16362 U.S. 199 (1960).
1460
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law readable, understandable, and even fascinating. 7 At one point
the author, speaking of the absence of legal implications upon a
denial of certiorari, says: "That is why various justices have tried
to educate the public" regarding this rule, and yet, "lawyers"
can easily be substituted for "public" without doing the profession
an injustice. Thus, in this and other like aspects Lewis also
provides a technical, procedural education for practitioners. However, it is the substantive aspects of constitutional law that are
of even greater interest to both lawyer and layman and the
volume abounds in these necessary digressions. For example, the
judicial power of review, ever-present and ever-important, creeps
into the discussion, together with the doctrine of self-restraint and
the Frankfurter-Black views thereon; the merits of federalism are
touched upon, although superficially; and the current judicial
debate concerning the application of the entire Bill of Rights to
the states is briefly analyzed.
Of even greater interest and importance to lawyers is the
opening glimpse, and then continuing discussion, of a competent
lawyer at work. That is to say, how the mind of Abe Fortas,
who was appointed by the Supreme Court as Gideon's counsel,
functioned in this case. How he was appointed is naturally interesting, but it is the discussion of how he fulfills this assignment
that will impress and educate the lawyer-reader. After a biographical treatment of Fortas, Lewis gets down to the business of
how this lawyer began his assignment. I wish space permitted
presenting verbatim pages 53-64 of the volume, for here is compressed a practical education for the trial or appellate lawyer.
Briefly, Fortas found that he first had to get the facts, not only
the facts appearing in the cold, bare certiorari record, but also
those in the trial record along with the personal, human touches
which only Gideon could supply. This was necessary even though
the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari had requested that counsel
include a reconsideration of the Betts holding, since the lawyer
assigned to aid Gideon was there to protect a client, not to expound
a theory, and the special circumstances rule which had followed
hot upon Betts might conceivably apply here. In other words,
Fortas owed Gideon the duty of not reconsidering Betts, if the
17 See LEws, GIDEoN's TRUMPET ch. 2, at 11-28 (1964). It is necessary
to include the pagination of this chapter since the volume, unfortunately,
does not contain a table of contents. Another minor criticism is that thL
author omits all references to Belts and Gideon in his Table of Cases because
they "appear so frequently that they are not indexed." Id. at 257. Consequently, the reader may have to search several minutes in order to locate
the citations to Gideon and Betts. Furthermore, and an even more minor
criticism, there are no footnotes. Instead, the references are gathered at
the end of the volume under pages and chapters. Hence, the reader is compelled to seek and perhaps not find the references. On the credit--side,

there is a list of suggested readings. Id. at 253-56.
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facts so permitted, even though in deference to the Supreme Court's
wishes the case and its reconsideration should be briefed. If the
special circumstances rule applied, then the major preparation and
argument should be directed to this area. Consequently, all of
the facts became important, and these had to be obtained. The
personal letter which Gideon sent to Fortas, outlining his life,
is a human interest document which reveals that law, as Lewis
puts it, involves "the smell of flesh and blood; [a lawyerj wants a
human being for a client, not an abstract principle." Nevertheless,
the details of Gideon's life disclosed little, if any, special circumstances which could be urged under the exceptions to the Betts
doctrine. The trial record then became important 's and a reading
of that document convinced Fortas and his associates that
there was no longer any question about the appropriateness of this case
as the vehicle to challenge Betts v. Brady. Plainly Gideon was not mentally
defective. The charge against him, and the proof, were not particularly
complicated. The judge had tried to be fair; at least there was no overt
bias in the courtroom. In short, Gideon had not suffered from any of
the special circumstances that would have entitled him to a lawyer under the
limited rule of Betts v. Brady. And yet it was altogether clear that a
lawyer would have helped. The trial had been a rudimentary one, with a
prosecution case that was fragmentary at best Gideon had not made a
single objection or pressed any of the favorable lines of defense. An
Arnold, Fortas and Porter associate said later: "We knew as soon as
we read that transcript that here was a perfect case to challenge the
assumption of Betts that a man could have a fair trial without a lawyer.
He did very well for a layman, he acted like a lawyer. But it was a
pitiful effort really. He may have committed this crime, but it was
never proved by the prosecution. A lawyer-not a great lawyer, just an
ordinary, competent lawyer-could have made ashes of the case."
Since special circumstances were out of the way, and since
the trial itself appeared to provide a good base upon which to
attack Betts, Fortas had to reconsider Betts in order to help Gideon.

But how should the brief be written and the oral argument made?
Again, the author gives a fascinating analysis which calls to mind
the late Judge Jerome Frank's practical views of the judicial approach to decisions and Thurman Arnold's realistic appraisal of
law in action (he is now a senior member in the Fortas firm).
Fortas had to think of a reconsideration of Betts in the light of
not only its theoretical bases, but also as interpreted and applied
by men, i.e., Justices of the Supreme Court. He was aware of the
fact that upon the current bench sat a few men who had already
either directly or impliedly manifested their views, viz., against
ISThis was later included in the Gideon brief and Florida's Attorney
General, upon oral argument, complained about its inclusion. "Justice Harlan: 'Why do you bother about that?' Jacob: 'Okay, I won't press it.'"
Id. at 176.
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changing the Betts rule. Furthermore, the judicial philosophy of
the present Justices had to be considered in the light of a reliance
upon the value of stare decisis, federalism, incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment, etc.
These pages, 84-94, are simply "must" re-reading for the purchaser of this volume.
At this point, however, Lewis digresses from these details
of Fortas' thinking and presents some background material on the
sixth amendment and on how Betts came to be decided. He also
shows that the Betts doctrine had not been accepted by the legal
profession since its birth and that this, in conjunction with other
factors, enabled Fortas to recognize "that the current of legal
history was moving with him." Even so, how would the Justices
vote? According to Lewis, the Fortas thinking disclosed that the
Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan would
favor reversal. Opposing would be Justices Stewart, Clark, and
Harlan, together with Frankfurter (who was expected to return
to the bench that fall despite his illness, but who retired, with
Justice Goldberg taking the seat), creating an apparently balanced
Court. How would the newest appointee, Justice White, vote?
Any mystery as to the voting was dissipated March 18, 1963
(the decision day). The Court was unanimous in overruling Betts,""
with Justice Black writing the majority opinion and Justices
Douglas, Clark, and Harlan concurring in the result but writing
separate opinions. In other words, Supreme Court box-scores, like
presidential polls, are subject to sudden change, and hence the
Justices cannot be dissected, catalogued, and boxed with any degree

of infallibility.
The preceding digression aside, Lewis returns to his lawyerat-work narrative. One thought became more and more a fact
as I read on. We have all read of and even had experience with
that legal gargantua, the big firm. I don't propose to debate this,
but I wonder what would have happened if Fortas had been a
single practitioner, for the work that Lewis portrays from here
on is that of a large, if not giant, law firm, which can call upon
its many members, associates, clerks and summer workers, to do
the job. Again I suggest as "must" reading pages 120-134,
for here are compressed the lawyers' efforts which produced the
brief digested at pages 135-138. Lewis concludes this phase of
the appeal with the printing and service of the brief, and a letter
from Gideon to Fortas thanking him for the work.
Lewis thereupon passes over to a discussion of Florida's opposition to Gideon's brief. Upon what meat has this state's attorney fed? After a brief presentation of the background of
Bruce Robert Jacob, the author discusses the reasons behind Jacob's
10 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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request to the other forty-nine states' attorneys to file amicus
briefs and the role of such briefs. Then comes a stinger! Jacob
had expected a degree of assistance from the other states because,
disregarding his personal views on the merits, most state attorneys
general would feel obliged (at least so he reasoned) to support a
position on Betts v. Brady which permitted them to act freely
without the compulsion of a supervening and uniform federal
requirement-freely, that is, with respect to providing counsel
in all criminal prosecutions. But instead of cooperation there came
opposition, e.g., only two states, Alabama and North Carolina,
eventually filed amicus briefs in support of Florida's position, while
twenty-two states endorsed, as amici, the brief filed by Massachusetts
supporting Gideon's position. If ever an appeal for cooperation
backfired, it was this one. Lewis relates the over-all details of the
Florida brief and then presents the separate Oregon and A.C.L.U.
amicus briefs opposing Florida.
Thereupon, the briefs having been filed, the oral argument
encompasses the entirety of Chapter 11. As before, this, too, is
"must" re-reading. A preliminary discussion of oral argument
ensues, wherein Lewis points up the informality of the Court during
argument; gives the sitting of the Justices and a one sentence background description of each; and then describes the case being
brought up before the tribunal. The give-and-take, the questions
and answers, the general and particular views, not only of the
Justices but of counsel, provide a fascinating background for any
lawyer or layman, for here is compressed the physical battle itself,
toward which all has been leading. Briefs and research, printed
words and phrases, all bow to the oral argument. Unfortunately
(to this writer) the requirements of space prevent Lewis from
incorporating more than he has selected, excellent though these
selections be. The flavor and the excitement of the courtroom's
atmosphere nevertheless do come through, and for this Mr. Lewis
is to be congratulated.
What follows is, today, anticlimactic since we all know that
Betts was overruled, and that Gideon v. Wainwright 20 has spawned
fresh problems, albeit minor on the comparative scale of values.
But for the average reader the discussion of the Court's determination and reading of its opinions is definitely of interest, as is the
practical aftermath of the reversal. Lewis does moralize to a
degree, but against the backdrop of what has preceded, this reads
well. The "Epilogue" is naturally of great importance, for the
reader's curiosity has long been aroused. Now that Gideon has
won his right to counsel, what has happened to him? The answer,
as recorded in the volume, is a description of Gideon's new trial
in which he was represented by a lawyer, but not until after some
pyrotechnics by Gideon. The transcript of the new trial is quoted
20

Ibid.
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almost ad nauseum, but at least the layman can see what is involved
in such a case. The result was a jury verdict of not guilty. Put
differently, a lawyer got Gideon off, whereas without one he had
lost. Lewis does not say whether Gideon's "fame" and any (questionable) sympathy for him influenced the verdict. Did Gideon feel
he accomplished something, asked a reporter after the trial? And
the final line of the volume is Gideon's reply, "Well I did." And
the final line of this review is, "And how !"
MoRRis DAVID FORKOSCH *

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.

